The project “Propaganda diary” on disinformation about Ukraine in German and Italian media is based on methodology. Here you can get the information about our methods and policies.

White and black lists of media

First, to form the database on disinformation it was necessary to identify key media outlets in relevant countries and distinguish credible sources from questionable ones. Thus, we created white and black lists of media in Germany and Italy.

Media on the white list are high-quality media providing reliable information about Ukraine’s foreign and domestic policies. On the contrary, sources on the black list spread fake news about Ukraine on a regular basis.

To differentiate sources and create these lists we used the following criteria:

• Content. All media outlets, either on the white list or on the black list, regularly report news and publish analytical articles about politics, international relations, Ukraine in particular.
• Professional standards. The high-quality media on the white list must meet the journalistic standards: comprehensiveness and impartiality of news coverage; objectivity and emotional neutrality; balance of opinions; availability and reliability of information sources; separation of facts and comments. Media on the black list constantly neglect these standards when reporting about Ukraine.
• Ownership and transparency. The media must publicly report about its owner, funding, and possible conflict of interest. For example, some Italian and German media are directly linked to Russian state-owned news agencies. Thus, such media will most likely spread disinformation about Ukraine.
• Results of media monitoring from Media Bias / Fact Check. We selected some of the media according to the resource Media Bias / Fact Check, an independent website that rates the bias, factual accuracy, and credibility of sources. According to this resource, the selected media on the black list have a very low or mixed level of factual reporting. The media on the white list are rated at the least biased sources and have a high level of factual reporting.
• Results of media monitoring from EUvsDisinfo. In addition, we used EUvsDisinfo databases on Germany and Italy, as well as cases of fake distribution recorded by German and Italian fact-checkers, who signed the IFCN Code of Principle. EUvsDisinfo is the project of the European External Action Service’s East StratCom Task Force. It was established specifically to monitor and counter the Russian disinformation campaigns in Europe.
• Results of our own media monitoring. When selecting media for monitoring, we have focused on the quality of reporting about Ukraine. The sources that published Russian disinformation previously were added to the black list.
• Consultations with German and Italian fact-checkers and journalists. We also sought advice from colleagues working in Germany and Italy. Representatives from different organizations advised us to pay attention to some media which were previously spreading fake news.

Disinformation narratives

The database consists of hundreds of manipulative news reports from German and Italian media. To categorize this dataset we classNameified news reports into dangerous and destabilizing narratives of the Russian disinformation campaign.

Different news reports are examples of a single disinformation narrative when they convey the same message, either explicit or hidden, intended to influence public opinion in relevant countries by distorting the picture of reality. All the narratives in the database are typical messages for the Russian disinformation campaign against Ukraine. For instance, “Ukraine is continuing military buildup in Donbas” and “Ukraine is violating the ceasefire regime” can be clear examples of the narrative “Ukraine fails to deliver commitments under the Minsk Agreements”, as they have the same meaning and purpose in terms of disinformation.

There are also subtypes of disinformation narratives. These subtypes specify the general narrative. For example, “The U.S. organized coup d'état in Ukraine in 2014” is a subtype of the narrative “Maidan in 2014 was a coup d'état”.

However, it is often impossible to identify the exact motives of authors, who participated in spreading fake news. Therefore we cannot confirm that all these authors and media spread disinformation about Ukraine on purpose. At the same time narratives in these media are similar or almost identical to those spread by the Russian Federation officials.

Types of disinformation

Disinformation is false or misleading information spread to influence public opinion and/or obscure the truth. It is frequently used deliberately as a tool in information warfare. In the case of the Ukraine-Russia war, disinformation is used to distort facts about Ukraine’s foreign and domestic policies and to create a negative image of Ukraine in the media and international politics.

During the evaluation of the German and Italian media from the black list we render the following verdicts for each disinformation material:

• Fake: the information is completely false and based on questionable sources.
• Manipulation: the information is partly true, but presented in a distorted context or not completely. The author of the manipulation is trying to convey a false message.
• Conspiracy theory: the information is false, but it is based on completely non-fact-checkable claims, i.e. some theories that explain events as a result of a secret plot.

These types of disinformation are common methods of the Russian campaigns against Ukraine. The most common topics among its disinformation narratives are:

• the Euromaidan/the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine;
• annexation of Crimea;
• the ongoing Ukraine-Russia war in Donbas;
• historic events, especially connected with the history of Ukraine-Russia relations;
• relations of Ukraine with the U.S., NATO, EU and other partners;
• reforms in Ukraine;
• Ukraine’s economy;
• “nazis and ultra-nationalists” in Ukraine;
• conspiracy theories about “external governance” in Ukraine, i.e. influence of the West on Ukraine’s foreign and domestic policies.

Fact-checking process

Authors of VoxCheck follow a transparent policy during fact-checking and debunking Russian disinformation about Ukraine. In our articles, we provide all sources for review in sufficient detail so that readers can reproduce our work, except when the personal security of the source may be compromised. In such cases, we provide the most detailed information. The quality of fact-checking is ensured by the project's editorial board.

VoxCheck as a signatory of the IFCN Code of principles abides by the commitments to:

• non-partisanship and fairness;
• standards and transparency of sources;
• transparency of funding and organization;
• standards and transparency of methodology;
• open and honest corrections policy.

You can find additional information about our policies and principles on our official website.

Primary sources of fact-checked information about Ukraine